Several non-mutually exclusive theories have been proposed to explain how corporate boards are structured. In this paper we group these theories into three hypotheses and test them empirically. The first hypothesis is that boards are shaped by the scope and complexity of the organization they are designed to oversee. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that board size and the fraction of independent outsiders are positively related to firm size, age, and diversification. The second hypothesis is that board composition is determined through negotiations between the CEO and outside board members. Consistent with this view, we find that the fraction of independent outsiders is negatively related to contemporaneous and lagged measures of the CEO's power. We also find support for the third hypothesis, which is that boards are shaped by the opportunities for private benefits and monitoring costs afforded by the firm's unique business environment. These results indicate that corporate boards adjust to the firm's specific advising and monitoring requirements, and undermine notions that one-size-fitsall remedies can improve board and firm performance. *This paper is preliminary and incomplete. Please do not quote without the authors' permission.
composition results from a negotiation between the firm's CEO and its outside board members.
We call this the negotiation hypothesis. The third hypothesis is that board size and composition are determined by the specific business and information environment in which the firm operates.
We call this view -which borrows from ideas expressed by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Gillan et al. (2003) , and modeled by Raheja (2003) -the monitoring hypothesis.
As illustrated in Table 1 and developed further in section 2, each of these hypotheses provides testable predictions about the forces that shape board size, composition, or both. We test these predictions using hand-collected data from a panel of 1,019 firms that went public between 1988 and 1992, which we track for periods of up to ten years. Our tests exploit the panel nature of the data, and control for the endogeneity of board size and composition.
The results provide support for all three hypotheses. In particular:
(i) Measures of the scope and complexity of the firm's operations -including firm size, firm age, and the number of the firm's business segments -are positively related to both board size and the fraction of independent outsiders on the board. This indicates that boards grow in response to the increasing net benefits of monitoring and specialization by board members that accompany a firm's growth.
(ii) The fraction of independent outsiders is negatively related to measures of the CEO's influence -including the CEO's share ownership and job tenure -and positively related to constraints on such influence, including the ownership of outside directors, the presence of a venture capitalist, and the reputation of the firm's investment bank at the time of its IPO. This supports Hermalin and Weisbach's (1998) theory that corporate boards reflect the outcome of a negotiation between the CEO and outside board members. Furthermore, the evidence indicates a significant degree in persistence in the bargaining outcome, as the CEO's bargaining power at the time of the IPO helps explain board composition even several years after the IPO.
(iii) Board size is positively related to measures of the private benefits available to insiders, and negatively related to measures of the cost of monitoring insiders. This is consistent with arguments forwarded by Lehn et al. (2003) and Raheja (2003) that board size reflects a trade-off between the firm-specific benefits of increased monitoring and the costs of such monitoring.
Overall, our results indicate that a combination of previous attempts to understand the forces that shape corporate boards provides greater insight than any one of these theories by itself. We propose that it is useful to view the evolution of corporate boards as endogenously molded by the firm's unique business and managerial characteristics. That is, board size and composition vary across firms, and change over time, to accomodate the specific growth, managerial, and monitoring characteristics of the firm. This implies that any single reform, such as the addition of independent outsiders, is unlikely to be a value-increasing policy for all firms, or even very many firms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II we discuss related research on corporate boards and develop the three hypotheses that coalesce the views of prior researchers.
Section III describes the characteristics of corporate boards at the time of the IPO for our sample of 1,019 firms going public from [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] , and describes the evolution of these firms' boards and ownership structures over the next ten years. In section IV we report the tests of our three main hypotheses. Section V concludes. Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that the way a firm is organized depends on the scope and complexity of its production process: larger or more complex processes lead to larger and more heirarchical firms. The firm's board, in turn, has the job of ratifying and monitoring senior managers' decisions. It follows that the information requirements of more complex operations tend to require larger boards.
Hypotheses of the determinants of corporate boards

2.A. The scope of operations hypothesis
This view, which we call the scope of operations hypothesis, is consistent with arguments made by Baker and Gompers (2003) , Lehn et al. (2003) , and Coles et al. (2003) . It implies that a firm growing into new product lines or new geographical territory will seek new board members to help oversee managers' performance. As a firm grows, or simply survives as a public entity, its demands for specialized board services also are likely to grow. As Bhagat and Black (1999) argue, new directors may have specialized knowledge that applies to the new growth areas.
Board of larger or more diverse firms also may increase their demands for new board members as such tasks as succession planning, compensation, and auditing are assigned to committees rather than handled by the board as a whole. The scope of operations hypothesis also is consistent with results reported by Denis and Sarin (1999) and Yermack (1996) , which suggest that board size is positively related to firm size.
In addition to affecting board size, the scope and complexity of a firm's operations can affect the board's composition. The increased demand for monitoring services suggests an increase in independent outsiders. Lehn et al. (2003) argue that the demand for outsiders grows because larger firms have greater agency problems than smaller firms. This is consistent with arguments and findings by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Denis and Sarin (1999) .
Similarly, Coles et al. (2003) argue that more diversified firms require larger boards.
Thus, as summarized in Table 1 , the scope of operations hypothesis predicts that board size and the fraction of independent outsiders on the board both are positively related to the scope and complexity of the firm's operations. In our empirical tests, we use three measures of the firm's scope and complexity: firm size, firm age, and the firm's number of business segments. The scope of operations hypothesis implies that all three measures will be positively related to board size and the fraction of independent outsiders. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) propose a model in which board structure is the outcome of a negotiation between the CEO and outside directors. In this model, CEOs that generate surpluses for their firms -that is, for whom good substitutes are unavailable -wield influence with their outside directions. CEOs will use their influence to place insiders and affiliated outsiders in open board positions. We refer to this argument as the negotiation hypothesis. Baker and Gompers (2003) argue that the IPO provides a particularly rich opportunity to test this hypothesis, as board composition frequently undergoes large changes around the time of the IPO.
2.b. The negotiation hypothesis
In our tests, we examine whether the CEO's influence at the time of the IPO, as well as afterward, affects the board's composition.
The negotiation hypothesis implies that the fraction of outsiders on the board will be negatively related to the CEO's influence and positively related to constraints on the CEO's influence. As summarized in Table 1 , we use two measures of the CEO's influence in our empirical tests: the CEO's stock ownership and the CEO's job tenure. Measures of constraints on this influence include outsider directors' stock ownership, a dummy variable that represents the presence of a venture capital investor at the time of the IPO, and the Carter-Manaster (1990) ranking of the reputation of the firm's investment banker at the time of its IPO.
2.c. The monitoring hypothesis
A third view is that boards develop in response to the specific monitoring requirements of the firm's business activity. We call this the monitoring hypothesis. Partial versions of the monitoring hypothesis are expressed in several papers on board and ownership structure. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) propose that the noisiness of a firm's operating environment will affect monitoring costs, a notion that Gillan et al. (2003) use to argue that boards will monitor less in noisy environments. Lehn et al. (2003) argue that high growth firms will have relatively few outside directors because the cost of monitoring such firms is relatively high. And Coles et al. (2003) argue that the fraction of independent outsiders will be negatively related to the firm's R&D expenditures, because outside board members are ineffective in monitoring firms with high growth potential.
These ideas are formalized and expanded in the model of board structure developed by Raheja (2003) . In this model, the net benefits of external monitoring increase with managers' opportunities to consume private benefits, but decrease with the cost of monitoring. Thus, boards will employ large numbers of outside directors, and be larger in overall size, when managers' private benefits are high and the cost of monitoring are low. That is, both board size and the fraction of outside directors are positively related to managers' private benefits and negatively related to the cost of monitoring.
In our tests, we use three measures of managers' potential private benefits: the firm's free cash flow, a Herfindahl measure of industry concentration, and a variation of Gompers, Iishi, and Metrick's (2003) G-index of the extent to which managers are insulated from the market for control by firm and state-level takeover defenses. We reason that managers' opportunities to extract private benefits increases with all three of these measures, increasing the net benefits of increased board monitoring.
To measure the cost of monitoring, we use the firm's market-to-book ratio, its R&D intensity, and the variance of the firm's daily stock return. We presume that the cost of monitoring increases with all three measures, implying that board size and the fraction of independent outsiders should be negatively related to all three. Our rationale is that growth opportunites are relatively costly for outsiders to monitor. Firms whose values reflect high growth opportunities, or which have high research and development expenses, tend to have significant growth opportunities. Similarly, the cost of monitoring managers is likely to increase with the volatility of the firm's stock price, because volatility reflects background uncertainty about the firm's prospects and performance, and increases the difficulty of judging managers' performance.
Description of the data
Our sample is based on all industrial firms that went public in U.S. markets from 1988 through 1992. To be included in the sample, the IPO must involve common stock offered at a minimum price of $1.00 per share and issued through a firm commitment underwriting agreement. In addition, the firm must be incorporated in the United States at the offer date and be identified on the CRSP daily tape as having been listed within three months of the offer date.
These criteria yield a sample of 1,019 IPOs, which explicitly excludes IPOs by financial institutions, real estate investment trusts, and closed-end mutual funds. In the tables that follow we use data from all surviving firms in any given year relative to the IPO. We also re-calculated our tests using data only from the 422 firms that survived through year 10. The results of such tests are virtually identical to those reported below in the tables. Thus, the changes over time that we report below do not reflect a change in the composition of the sample, but rather, the general trends in ownership and board structure as firms mature from the IPO stage. Table 3 reports on the board and ownership characteristics of the 1,019 firms at the times of their IPOs. Panel A indicates that the IPO firms are small, averaging $150.22 million in equity value. As a basis of comparison, the mean equity value in Denis and Sarin's (1999) sample of seasoned firms is $434.61 million. Compared to Denis and Sarin's sample, the IPO firms also have a lower mean debt-to-total assets ratio (35 percent vs. 56 percent) and a higher expenditure on research and development compared to total assets (11 percent vs. 1.58 percent).
3.a. Board characteristics and ownership at the time of the IPO
These averages are consistent with the stereotype of many firms at the IPO stage: they are relatively small, financed significantly by equity capital, and actively engaged in research and development activities. Table 3 Given that firms at the IPO stage have great incentive to maximize firm value, these results indicate that small boards with a majority of independent outside directors tend to be optimal for these firms. This holds despite the fact that inside ownership in these firms is relatively high. Thus, even though agency problems in the IPO firms may be relatively small because managers own large amounts of stock, these firms rely heavily upon independent outside directors.
Panel B of
3.b. Changes in board characteristics and ownership over time
To track the evolution of ownership and board structure over time, we collected data on all firms in the sample at the IPO and at one year, four years, seven years, and ten years after the IPO. Data from the IPO come from the offering prospectuses, and data for subsequent years come from proxy statements.
Panel A of Table 4 reports on the evolution of ownership for the IPO firms. Ownership by officers and directors declines steadily over the period, declining by half in the first 10 years after going public, from 50 percent at the IPO to 25 percent ten years later. Average CEO ownership is 15 percent immediately after the IPO and drops steadily over time, to an average of eight percent ten years later (which is similar to the seven percent found by Denis and Sarin for seasoned firms). Ownership by officers follows a similar decline, from 25 percent after the IPO to 14 percent at year 10 (the comparable number from Denis and Sarin is 16 percent).
Ownership by outside directors also declines steadily over the period, from 25 percent to 10 percent. Interestingly, ownership by five percent blockholders remains fairly steady over time at about 30 percent, as does the number of blockholders (an average of roughly three blockholders per firm). Table 4 reports on characteristics of the CEOs using data on all surviving firms at each year of the analysis. The average CEO is 48 years old at the IPO, with eight years of tenure with the firm. For 43 percent of firms conducting IPOs, the CEO is also the founder.
Panel B of
By year 10 only 21 percent of the CEOs are firm founders. The fraction of CEOs who also serve as Chairman of the Board is fairly constant over time, ranging from 60 percent to 64 percent of firms. CEO turnover ranges from six percent in the first public year to almost 10 percent per year in later years (30 percent of all firms experienced CEO turnover between year 1 and year 4, with 25% between year 4 and year 7, and 30% between year 7 and year 10, for an average of almost 10 percent of firms experiencing CEO turnover per year over these periods).
Panel C of Table 4 reports on the board structure for firms at the IPO and afterwards.
The average number of directors increases steadily after the IPO, starting at 6.21 in the year of the IPO and rising to 7.52 by year 10. Even after 10 years, however, the mean number of directors remains smaller than the mean of 9.35 reported by Denis and Sarin or the 9.44 reported by Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) , both using samples of generally more seasoned firms.
This suggests that corporate boards continue to grow as a firm ages beyond 10 years. (Another influence on this difference, however, is that the data for year 10 in our sample represent boards during the 1998-2002 period, whereas Denis and Sarin's sample spans the 1983-1992 period.
Wu (2000) reports that corporate boards decreased in size during the early 1990s in response to pressure from large institutional shareholders.)
The increase in board size reflects primarily the addition of independent outside board members, the fraction of which grows steadily until it reaches 69 percent by year 10. The fraction of affiliated outsiders stays roughly constant over time, while the fraction of insiders decreases steadily, to reach 26 percent by year 10. Thus, the proportion of outside representation on these firms' boards increases as they age. Table 6 also provides data on the fraction of original board members remaining with the firm. In the first year, 90 percent of the original board members remain with the firm. This figure declines to 67 percent by year 4, 51 percent by year 7, and 42 percent by year 10.
To summarize, several patterns emerge about the evolution of leadership structure in the 10 years following a firm's IPO. Ownership by officers and directors falls, presumably as share ownership becomes more widely diffused. The number of directors increases, although not to as high a level as observed in older, seasoned firms. Firms at the IPO stage have a higher fraction of independent outsiders on their boards than do the typical seasoned corporation, and this fraction increases over time.
Empirical tests of the determinants of board structure
Empirical methods
Our data comprise a panel over the years 1, 4, 7, and 10 relative to the IPO. To test the scope of operations, negotiation, and monitoring hypotheses, we estimate multivariate regressions using panel data methods. The tests reported in the tables are robust regressions with clusters, in which observations are clustered by firm and the covariance matrix is estimated using the Huber (1964) or White (1980) estimator. This allows us to exploit information in both the cross-section and time-series nature of the data, while still controlling for the serial correlation that is observed for each firm's time series of observations. Random effects GLS models yield results that are qualitatively identical to those reported here.
We deploy two strategies to control for the fact that board size and composition are endogenous to the firm's competitive environment. First, we include industry fixed effects in all regression models. Industry controls make sense if the underlying forces that simultaneously drive board size and composition are similar for all firms in the same industry. We assume this is the case, because firms in the same industry face similar production technologies and market conditions -the very things that give rise to the endogeneity problem in the first place. By controlling for industry fixed effects, our tests measure how deviations from the industry mean in a firm's board characteristics are related to deviations in the regressors from their industry means.
That is, industry fixed effects control for the source of the endogenous nature of the firm's board and other characteristics. To define industry groupings, we use Compustat's two-digit SIC industry definitions, which Kahle and Walkling (1996) demonstrate perform well in certain tests requiring industry controls.
Our second strategy to control for the endogeneity problem is to introduce instrumental variables for board size and the fraction of independent outsiders. In the tests reported here, our instrumental variables are these variables' lagged values. For example, for firm j's observation at year 10 relative to the IPO, the instrumental variable for board size is firm j's board size at year 7 (because we have data for years 0, 1, 4, 7, and 10). In the tests reported below, we include instrumental variables for board size in our tests for board independence, and for board independence in our tests for board size. It turns out, however, that including these or additional instruments for other variables that plausibly could be endogenous does not affect the results substantially. This suggests that the industry fixed effects do a good job of controlling for the endogeneity problem, and that the instrumental variables are redundant. 
4.b. The scope of operations hypothesis
As summarized in Table 1 , we use firm size, firm age, and diversification as measures of the scope and complexity of the firm's operations. The scope of operations hypothesis predicts that board size and the fraction of outsiders are positively related to all three measures. Firm size is measured as the natural log of the market value of equity calculated at the end of the firm's fiscal year. Age is calculated as the number of years since the firm's IPO.
3 And the number of business segments reported by the firm, as carried by Compustat, is used to measure diversification. As additional controls, we include dummy variables for firms that went public in reverse leveraged buyouts, firms that went public as equity carveouts, and firms with dual-class shares. (Although the results are not significantly affected when reverse LBOs, equity carveouts, and dual-class share firms are excluded from the sample.)
The results are reported in Table 5 . In Panel A, the number of directors on the board is the dependent variable, and the lagged value of the fraction of independent outsiders is included as an instrumental variable to control for endogeneity. In Models 1-3, each of the measures of firm scope is entered separately, and all three are positively and significantly related to board size. This provides strong support for the scope of operations hypothesis. In Model 4, all three measures are included together. All are positively related to board size, and firm size and the number of business segments both remain statistically significant at the 1% level. We interpret these results as indicating that board size is indeed shaped by the scope and complexity of the firm's operations.
Panel B of Table 5 reports results when the fraction of independent outsiders is the dependent variable. As reported in Models 1 -3, the coefficients for all three measures of scope and complexity are positive and significant at the 1% level when each is entered separately.
When all are entered together, as in Model 4, the coefficients all are positive, and those for firm size and age remain statistically significant. Overall, these results support the scope of operations hypothesis, which holds that corporate boards increase in size and independence as firm operations grow, mature, and become more complex.
4.c. The negotiation hypothesis
As summarized in Table 1 , we use two sets of variables to test the view that the composition of the board reflects a negotiation between the CEO and outside board members.
CEO share ownership and CEO job tenure measure the CEO's influence in the negotiation. CEO ownership is measured as the fraction of the firm's currently outstanding shares owned by the CEO. CEO tenure is the number of years in which the CEO has held his or her position with the firm. Outside director ownership, venture capital investment, and investment bank reputation measure the constraints on the CEO's influence. Outside director ownership is the fraction of outstanding shares owned by independent outside directors. The venture capital dummy variable is set to one if a venture capital investor owned an equity stake at the IPO, and the investment bank reputation is measured by the bank's Carter-Manaster rank at the time of the firm's IPO.
The negotiation hypothesis predicts that board independence is negatively related to CEO ownership and job tenure, and positively related to outside director ownership, venture capital investment, and investment bank reputation.
The results are reported in Table 6 . In Models 1 -5, each of the five measures is included separately, and all five are significantly related to board independence in the predicted direction. In Model 6, all five measures are included together. Despite the potential multicollinearity, all five remain significantly related to board independence. Model 7 includes also the regressors used to test the scope of operations hypothesis. Once again, all five measures used to test the negotiation hypothesis have the predicted signs, and all but the Carter-Manaster rank are statistically significant. Overall, these results provide strong support for the negotiation hypothesis. Furthermore, the variables used to test the scope of operations hypothesis remain similar in sign and statistical significance to the results reported in Table 5 , Panel B, indicating empirical support for both the scope of operations and negotiation hypotheses.
Note that two of our measures -the venture capital dummy and the Carter-Manaster rank -are measured at the time of the IPO. Baker and Gompers (2003) argue that the IPO is a particularly ripe time to investigate the negotiation hypothesis. This is because many firms' boards undergo significant changes around the IPO, and any negotiating influence that a CEO has will come into play at such times. Our results indicate that such measures of influence at the time of the IPO are useful in explaining board composition even in the years after the IPO.
However, in tests not reported here, we find that such measures become less useful as the firm ages beyond its IPO. That is, the VC dummy and the Carter-Manaster rank are strongly correlated with board independence in the year of the IPO and the year afterward, but the correlation declines in years 4, 7, and 10 relative to the IPO. This implies that CEOs who are able to pack their boards with friendly insiders at the time of the IPO are able to perpetuate their influence on the board into future years, but such influence at the time of the IPO declines over time.
4.d. The monitoring hypothesis
As summarized in Table 1 , we use six different variables to test the monitoring hypothesis. The monitoring hypothesis implies that board size and independence are positively related to managers' opportunities for private benefits. To measure private benefits, we use:
(i) free cash flow, measured as the firm's earnings plus depreciation minus capital expenditures, all divided by assets. As argued by Jensen (1986) , free cash flow generates agency conflicts, as managers have incentive to use it for private benefits rather than to create shareholder wealth;
(ii) industry concentration, measured as the Herfindahl index of industry sales using data on Compustat-listed firms. We conjecture that managers at firms with market power are subject to less market discipline, and are better able to extract private benefits than managers of firms in highly competitive industries;
(iii) takeover defenses, measured using a variation of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's (2003) G-Index. In our variation, we compute G as the firm's number of takeover defenses plus the number of state antitakeover laws that apply to the firm. The takeover defenses and state antitakeover laws are those defined and tracked by Field and Karpoff (2002) . Larger levels of the G-Index indicate a greater amount of insulation from the external market for control and a greater opportunity for managers to extract private benefits.
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The monitoring hypothesis also predicts that board size and independence are negatively related to the cost to outsiders of monitoring the firm's managers. To measure such costs, we use:
(i) the market-to-book ratio, defined as the book value of debt plus the market value of equity, divided by the book value of assets;
(ii) A dummy variable that is set equal to one for firms whose R&D expenditures divided by assets ranks in the upper quartile of firms; and (iii) the stock return variance, measured as the variance of the daily logarithmic stock return measured over the preceding fiscal year.
The rationale for all three measures is similar. Firms with market-to-book ratios or high research and development expenses tend to have significant growth opportunities, the management of which are more costly for outsiders to monitor and verify than are assets in place. Similarly, the cost of monitoring managers is likely to increase with the volatility of the firm's stock price, because volatility reflects background uncertainty about the firm's prospects and performance, and increases the difficulty of judging managers' performance.
The empirical results for board size are reported in Tables The tests of the monitoring hypothesis' predictions for board independence are summarized in Table 8 . For ease of reporting, Table 8 
Conclusion
Corporate boards are the subject of much policy concern and a growing number of research papers. Policy arguments, such as those that influenced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, presume that outside policy directives can improve board performance. Many researchers, in contrast, argue that boards develop in response to certain firm characteristics, and have proposed a number of firm characteristics that may be important in shaping corporate boards.
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In this paper we test empirically the notion that boards are adapted to the characteristics of the firms they are designed to oversee. Our innovation is to consider simultaneously a large number of previous arguments about which firm characteristics affect board size and independence. We group these arguments into three testable hypotheses, which we then test empirically using hand-collected and Compustat data from 1,019 firms that went public from 1988-92, which we track for ten years after the IPO.
The results support the hypothesis that board size and independence are shaped by the size, scope, and complexity of the firm's operations. The results also support Hermalin and Weisbach's (1998) argument that board independence is affected by a negotiation between the CEO and outside directors. A third hypothesis holds that board size and independence reflect a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of monitoring top managers. The results provide some support for this hypothesis, but the support is not as strong or consistent as for the first two hypotheses.
In total, the data indicate that board size and independence are shaped by a broad combination of firm and managerial characteristics. Larger, more seasoned, and more diverse firms tend to have larger and more independent boards. Firms in which managers have substantial influence, perhaps because they generate quasi-rents for the firm, and in which the constraints to managerial influence are weak, have less independent boards. And there is some evidence that firms in which managers' opportunities to consume private benefits, or in which the cost of monitoring managers is small, have larger and more independent boards.
Our data also provide descriptive evidence about the development of corporate boards during the first 10 years after a firm's IPO. We find that firms average three fewer directors at their IPO than large, seasoned firms (6.2 versus 9.4). These new firms add an average of 0.13 board members per year during the 10 years after the IPO. This moves their boards closer in size to those for large seasoned firms, but after 10 years the average board remains relatively small (7.3 versus 9.4). Boards of these IPO firms are have a majority (56.5%) of independent outsiders, and continue to add independent outsiders such that, 10 years later, 65.3% are independent outsiders. The increase in the fraction of independent outsiders occurs even as one important type of outsider -venture capital investors -tend to leave the board.
Overall, the data indicate that corporate boards adjust to meet the specific characteristics of the firm's business environment. We propose that board structure does not result from a mechanical process that easily can be improved by uniform rules on board size and composition, but rather, reflects a dynamic process involving the particular, and changing, nature of the firm's competitive environment and managerial team. The important drivers that shape corporate boards, in turn, can be partitioned into three categories: the scope of the firm's operations, the top manager's influence, and firm-specific opportunities for managerial consumption on the job and the costs of monitoring top managers.
Table 1. Predictions of the Hypotheses
This table summarizes the empirical predictions of the three hypotheses tested in this paper with regard to the size of the board ("Number of Directors") and independence of the board ("Fraction of Independent Directors). The "Scope of Operations Hypothesis" argues that boards grow in response to the increasing net benefits of monitoring and specialization of board members that accompany a firm's growth. The "Negotiations Hypothesis" argues that corporate boards reflect the outcome of a negotiation between the CEO and outside board members. The "Monitoring Hypothesis" argues that board size reflects a trade-off between the firm-specific benefits of increased monitoring and the costs of such monitoring. [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] . Firm market value is the price at the end of the year in which the firm went public multiplied by shares outstanding and is given millions. Firm Debt to Assets is the debt of the firm divided by company assets. CEO Ownership is the percent of shares outstanding owned by the current CEO of the firm. Firm R&D/Assets is research and development costs divided by firm assets. Officer and Director Ownership shows the percent of total shares held by all of the officers and directors of the corporation. Number of directors is the size of the board at the IPO. Percent Insiders is the percent of the board who are employees of the firm. Percent Outsiders is the fraction of board members who are nonemployees of the firm. 
Number of Directors
